I. Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Technology and technological gaps between states are seen to be of fundamental importance in the second half of the 20th century. These gaps are perceived as the sources of international economic disparities and of differences in military power. Technology is a central focus of the dialogue between the advanced industrialized world (the North) and the industrializing countries (the South). 1 It is also seen as a major factor in the assessment of the military balance between the US and USSR. According to the dominant view, while the USSR may have deployed more weapons and men than the US, this imbalance is offset by American qualitative superiority resulting from technological leadership. 2 Recognition of the centrality of these technological disparities has naturally led to efforts to diminish, close, or even reverse them. The process of technological development in such "follower" countries can, in a broad sense, be attributed to a combination of the mobilization of internally accessible resources and the transfer of technology from external sources.
The precise nature of the link between these aspects of technological development varies according to country, sector, and specific technology. For example, Japan has been very successful in absorbing foreign technology and building on that base through the efficient allocation of internal resources. 3 , 4 Other countries are widely considered to have difficulties absorbing transferred technology to a level of product quality comparable to that of the source country. 5 While this is generally true for non-industrialized states, it is also apparently the case for some countries as relatively developed as the USSR.
The importance of technology transfer to the economic and military
capabilities of the USSR has led to a major policy debate in the US. Since the Cold War, the US has attempted to restrict the export of critical technologies to the Soviet Union. Export control laws were established and licenses required in these areas. In addition, the US pursuaded its NATO allies and Japan to participate in this effort. An informal group known as the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was created to provide a forum in which uniform policies for technology transfer could be developed. 6 In the past decade, however, these structures have been subject to attack from a variety of perspectives. For some, the policies were becoming increasingly porous, allowing the USSR to obtain forei.gn technology through a variety of "unplugged leaks". 7 On the other hand, those with an interest in the Soviet market have argued that such restrictions are of. little significance in the wake of growing Soviet technological progress, and simply deprive the firms of business. Some political analysts have also argued that the free-flow of technology creates an interdependent relationship which limits conflict and forces the USSR to "think twice" before undertaking political initiatives which might interrupt the flow of this technology.
According to this view, limits on technolgy transfer will merely encourage the USSR to develop their own capabilities in these areas. 8 These criticisms have led to a number of new studies and efforts to assess US policy in this area, and have resulted in a variety of policy prescriptions aimed at minimizing the transfer of "sensitive" technology to the USSR. The prescriptions range from a broad prohibition on the transfer of products, processes, or know how to specific efforts to identify the most sensitive and unavailable technologies on which to focus. 9 The wide variation of perspectives and policy prescriptions can be attributed, in large part, to the general lack of understanding of the links between indigenous technological development and technology transfer. Most of the evaluations of this link are impressionistic, or at best, are based on a few well known case studies. Analysts speak of technological gaps in terms of years between the US and USSR levels of proficiency, or of the US as being In this paper, we shall present a semi-empirical, quantitative model of technological "catch-up" which relates the behaviors of the technological leader and followers. The behavior of the follower nation(s) is described by differential equations which relate the rates of progress of leaders and followers to their present levels of achievement and to the technological gap between them. These coupled equations are solved to yield a generalized analytic solution for the level of proficiency of the follower as a function of time in terms of some initial levels of technology for the leader and follower, and constants describing the indigenous rates of development for both and the rate of technology transfer between them.
While this model incorporates a number of simplifying assumptions that are discussed below, it can be used as a first approximation to describe the behavior of leaders and followers and to assess the rate constants. We begin this assessment by exploring various classes of behavior which apply to different situations and distinct relationships between the indigenous rate constants and the rate of technology transfer. On this basis, we illustrate the model through a comparison of the evolution of US and Soviet main-frame computers over 25 years and calculate the rate constants in this case. As will be demonstrated, the general model is found to be applicable to this case and is useful in analyzing the nature of the technological gap in this area.
II. Conceptual Development of the Model
As many studies have shown, technological development in general follows a logistic curve. 13 This curve, first proposed by the demographer Raymond Pearl in the 19th century, follows a trace best described by the letter "S".
The logistic curve describes exponential growth, which is constrained by a limit over which it cannot grow. The limit may be physical like the speed of light, or may consist of economic or social constraints, as were apparent in the case of air transport and the SST. At the beginning, a logistic curve is essentially identical to an exponential curve. As the technology advances, however, the curve begins to deviate from the exponential. The extent to this deviation increases, and in the final stage, the curve assymptotically approaches the established limit for development. In other words, the development of a given technology begins slowly and the curve is rather flat. (Fig. 1 ) After a short period of time, the level of proficiency increases more and more rapidly. In the third stage, the physical limits of the technology are neared, or the market is saturated, and the evolution slows again.
In analyzing technological development and transfer, there is usually a clear distinction between the technological "leaders" and the technological "followers". 1 4 For any particular technology, the leaders, by definition, are the first to develop and market the innovation and to make improvements in the technology.
The follower states, (or firms, in a domestic context), in turn, develop or otherwise acquire the same technology later than the leaders, often using concepts, personnel or components supplied by the leaders. Ideas and methods developed externally can provide the follower with a basic direction and "proof of concept" for internal development, and publications often provide details. Specific components and machinery imported from abroad can create the foundations for indigenous development, or can supply the few basic pieces in the process which are not internally available.
Perhaps most importantly, the physical movement of people provides a great deal of expertise. Students and trained professionals can gain "hands on experience" in foreign labs and enterprises and experts from the leader states and firms are often available to provide assistance. 1 5 These various contributions can come through legal channels or less orthodox paths, but the objective is the same. Regardless of the path and source, during the learning phase, each form of technology transfer is expected to aid development.
By definition, the technological followers start later or, as happens in many cases, their indigenous development capabilities are initially much more limited than that of the leader. Thus, the initial growth rates are slower.
While external sources of technology may exist and be available, the follower usually lacks the infrastructure necessary to absorb and exploit this potential. There may be insufficient trained personnel to comprehend the available material, or essential resources or skills may be lacking. (For example, the blueprints for aircraft engine manufacture are widely available, but the necessary materials and skills to produce the parts are scarce.)
As the level of technological capability increases, however, the follower begins to"catch up" with the leader, and the gap between them may be reduced, (unless the leader has gone to a new technology and thus begun the process again). During this stage, technology transfer is likely to be of greatest importance. As the gap decreases, the role of technology transfer is again reduced. There is little to learn from external sources, and the rate of development is largely determined by the nature of the technology and the availability of indigenous resources.
In summary, then, the role of technology transfer for a follower country can be described in terms of three phases:
*The initial phase, in which development is slow compared to that of the leader and the absorptive capacity for technology transfer is too limited to allow a high rate of progress; *The "learning" phase, in which the rate of development is much greater and depends both on the indigenous resources, the gap between leader and follower, and the rate of technology transfer; *The third phase, in which the gap is reduced or closed and the role of technology transfer is again reduced. (In many cases, this phase is far out in the future. There are, however, some notable exceptions, as in the case of Japan, S. Korea, Israel, and other intensively innovating states.)
A Quantitative Formulation of the Model
In attempting to assess and analyze the role of technology transfer, a number of specific questions are in order. Perhaps the most important concern the degree to which technology transfer can assist the rate of development of the follower country in a specific technology. In most cases, for example, there is evidence that transferred technology contributes in a significant manner to the rate of development. When the technology is close to its pre-ordained limits and the leader relinquishes its efforts to innovate in this technology, the follower can close the gap, and even overtake the leader. (Case a, figure 2 ) In other cases, however, the potential to transfer the same technology has little impact on the rate of development.
The gap between leader and follower increases despite technology transfer (Case b).
The purpose of this section is to develop a quantitative method for comparing the rates of development of the leader and follower, to allow for an evaluation of these and related issues.
As noted above, it is assumed that the leader develops in a manner independent of the follower. Technological proficiency may be measured by some quantity P. Use of P in a quantitative model would not be sensible, however, since any function of P might just as well have been used and would change the model properties. We introduce a dimensionless measure x, that is, some function of P; x = f(P) (1) so that
for the leader. Thus, we are assuming that there is some measure of technology that increases linearly in time for a leading (or decoupled)
country. The development of the follower must be measured in a similar form, though this will not, of necessity, imply a linear increase with time for XF (technological know-how) of the follower. From equations 1 and 2, we can conclude that the simplest function representation of the connection between the measures X and P is
This is consistent with emprical evidence that technological proficiency P evolves exponentially.* *This presentation of the problem does not incorporate the effects of physical limits to development. It is, thus, appropriate to apply it only at the first stages of growth.
The rate of technological progress of the follower consists of two contributions: dxF/dt= KF + fl (XF) f2(XL, XF) Eq.3
The first contribution, kF, represents the indigenous development of the follower and the second contribution represents that of technology transfer. In many cases, kF is significantly less than the second transfer term and progress is thus dependent on the gap between leader and follower. As the gap decreases, the contribution of technology transfer would logically become less significant, while for large gaps, the follower has a large reservoir from which to draw.
The functions fl(xF) and f2(XL, XF) are generalized functions implying a dependence of the follower's rate of progress on his technological proficiency in the field and on the gap between him and the leader. In this case, the simplest form is f2(xL, XF) = (XL -XF) Eq.4
We choose fl(xF) to be a dual-valued function, such that for small xF, it is zero, but when xF has crossed a particular threshhold, it is a constant, kT. 
Eq.8
The solution to the homogenous equation is:
where C is a constant of integration. We can also assume that a particular solution will have the same form as the solution for the leader. Thus, xp = A + Bt Eq.9
Plugging this into Eq. 2-8, we find that B + kTA + kTBt = kF + kTX + kTkLt
Eq.10
Matching constant and first-order terms in time, we find:
Eq.ll (kF-kL)/kT + X Eq.12
Thus, the development of the follower as a function of time is:
XF(t) =(kF-kL)/kT + xO + kLt + CekTt
Eq.13
To solve for the constant of integration, C we use an initial condition. At t=O:
and C=xP -x0 -(kF-kL)/kT
Eq.14 Finally, this yields the following analytic solution: follower's rate is greater than that of the leader, is possible, but inthis case, the follower would eventually become the leader and is thus included in the first case. A more detailed analysis of this third case will be presented in a subsequent paper.)
In cases where the indigenous rates of development are similar, so that the rate of the leader is only marginally greater than that of the follower, the asymptotic level of the gap is relatively small.
In contrast, when the indigenous rate of development of the follower is significantly smaller than that of the leader, the gap grows much more rapidly at the beginning and the "steady state" gap is far larger than that in the previous case. to Soviet equipment or knowledge, no matter how obsolete in terms of the U.S., will be exploited by the Soviet military. 16 Much of the debate hinges on the relative rates of progress of computer development, and is thus an example of the type of issue which appears amenable to the quantitative analysis proposed in this study.
In analyzing the development of digital computer technology in the USSR relative to that of the US, we are also taking advantage of the fact that the USSR has chosen a "follower" strategy. As Goodman 1 For cryptography, rapid manipulation of data is central, and a computer which is optimized for the former is unlikely to also be optimized for the latter task. A very important descriptive effort comparing US and Soviet computers in great detail has been undertaken by Goodman, et al.19 In order to illustrate the model, we have chosen a single parameter P by which to compare US and Soviet computer development. Our choice is the number of operations per second (ops) of which a given computer is capable. (Other measures, such as the power/delay factor, mean-time between failuires (MTBF), or cost per instruction, were considered, but data for these factors in both the US and USSR was not readily available. In addition, the ops measure is similar to the "processing data rate" (PDR) used by the US government and the COCOM countries to compare computer capabilities. Thus, this figure of merit provides data is relatively parallel to that used in the context of debates over the transfer of computer technolgy to the USSR.)20
For the US, the rate of development displays, an exponential growth pattern for P. Thus, using X = ln P we will satisfy our linear growth In the process of accruing knowledge and gaining access to external technology, the capabilty has grown rapidly. The development curve is much steeper than was apparent during the earlier phase, when transferred technology played a significantly lesser role. For this case, we calculate by curve fitting a value of KT = .06 yr~l for the constant describing the rate of technology transfer.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a particular quantitative model of A complete exploration of the insights provided by the model will require detailed analyses in a variety of cases involving different technologies and different countries. However, some preliminary implications are suggested in the case of US and Soviet computer development which we have examined. In particular, we observe that the behavior of the USSR is consistent with that of a technological follower. We also note that the indigenous capability is limited but significant in the area of computer development.
At the same time, we note that the gap could also potentially be 
